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COST VALUATION:  







The purpose of this MBA Project was to investigate and provide an overview of 
current cost valuation methods used to compare aircraft and then determine if the current 
methods were satisfactory for comparing dissimilar aircraft platforms.  The goal of the 
project was to develop a model using O&S and procurement cost inputs together with 
aircraft inventory and utilization data in order to produce a cost per unit hour for any 
given aircraft.  A demonstration of the model’s validity using aircraft and cost data from 
the Predator UAV and the F-16 was then performed to illustrate how it can be used to aid 
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As missions for UAV’s and manned aircraft converge, both the operational and 
budgeting communities must adjust their future plans to ensure that an effective balance 
is achieved and avoid over-duplication of requirements.  For the budgeting community, 
this requires a better method for comparing program costs than what is currently 
available.  
This research project provides one solution to the problem of comparing 
dissimilar platforms with like missions.  By applying the common costs associated with 
separate programs and combining them with inventory and utilization data, the 
comparison of dissimilar platforms is possible on a cost per unit hour basis. 
In order to demonstrate the model two aircraft were selected; the F-16 and its 
variants, and the Predator UAV.  Data were then collected for each aircraft from the Air 
Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) database in the areas of procurement cost, O&S 
cost, inventory, and annual flight hours.  The data were then sorted and individually 
placed into a model based on the formula [(C1+C2)/h] / i = aircraft cost per unit hour.  
There were five trends observed when the calculations for each aircraft were 
completed.  The first trend was that O&S costs increase as a function of time and not in 
proportion to any other variable.  The second trend was that as the number of aircraft 
increase, the cost per unit flight hour decreases.  Trend three revealed that as flight hours 
increase, the cost per unit flight hour decreases.  Fourth was that procurement cost has 
very little effect on cost per flight hour in a mature system while O&S costs represent a 
significant portion of the final cost per unit flight hour.  Lastly, O&S costs and 
procurement costs have equal influence on systems that have not reached full production.  
These trends were then interpreted and explained with particular reference to their 


















































A recent report by the Congressional Research Service identified that growth rates 
for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) has increased sharply in recent years (Geer and 
Bolkcom, 2004).  The budgeting community is concerned that some UAV systems may 
be duplicating current manned systems, while proponents argue that not only do they 
duplicate capabilities, they also accomplish the mission at a lower cost.  Additionally, 
there are some that think the systems are being developed too quickly and that we are 
therefore making sacrifices in terms of quality and efficiency.  According to the report 
prepared by Geer and Bolkcom (2004), many members of Congress “appear to want 
assurances that tax-payer dollars are being well spent” (p.9) which would require some 
method of cost valuation.   
Additionally Geer and Bolkcom (2004) suggested that with new unmanned 
systems being designed to carry munitions, this would indicate a changing mission for 
UAVs from reconnaissance to strike missions.  This is evidenced in the new Predator B 
and the most recent version of Predator dubbed the “Hunter-Killer”.  Comparisons with 
similar manned counterparts for budget purposes may also be necessary in the near 
future. 
There are some areas that Geer and Bolkcom (2004) do not specifically state a 
need for research, such as the number of aircraft necessary to meet mission requirements, 
the number of flight hours that the platform logs annually, O&S costs associated with the 
program, and the mishap rates of the aircraft.  These are areas of cost, inventory, and 
utilization that help define a workable cost structure solution and should be considered 
when drafting a cost structure intended for use as a comparative tool.   
The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPES) 
framework provides an opportunity to examine previous year’s decisions and compare 
them with a changing environment.  Ultimately, this system places money in the hands 
that need it most, and delivers the best mix of combat equipment to commanders that are 
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fighting the current assessed threat (DAU, 2003).  The system is effective to this end; 
however, it depends upon the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) that the service 
submitted for that year.  If changes are to be made after the DOD budget has been 
“locked” and sent to OMB, they can only be made inside of what has been budgeted to 
that service component by removing money from one program and placing it into 
another.  While Congress could make changes during the appropriations process, this is 
based on a generic assumption that they would not.  It is imperative then, that the proper 
investment split has been made at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level 
prior to submitting the military component of the President’s budget so that over 
duplication of capabilities will not occur, and to ensure that our capabilities are in 
agreement with the current assessed threat.  According to the U.S. Department of Defense 
(2003), this is accomplished through the individual service component’s accurate 
reporting of program costs to the Undersecretary of Defense (USD).   
Unfortunately, given the nature of the different manned and unmanned programs, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to select one type of cost valuation to achieve a fair 
comparison between platforms.  This has resulted in a need for a system that can compile 
all relevant costs as well as usage, and number of units, into a single usable metric that 
will allow comparison of similar and dissimilar systems.   
 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
A report recently released by the Congressional Research Service addressed some 
of the issues surrounding the rapid acquisition and development of Unmanned Systems 
within DoD (Geer and Bolkcom, 2004).  Among their concerns were how lawmakers 
would determine the best investment split between manned and unmanned systems in 
order to match the capability of the US with the current assessed threat and which 
systems can best neutralize the threat at what cost.  Additionally, as unmanned systems 
become more technically sophisticated and mature, capabilities between manned and 
unmanned systems are becoming less discernable and the need to predict a clear winner 
from a cost standpoint has become increasingly important to lawmakers.  At the center of 
the problem is the lack of a common cost structure between manned and unmanned 
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programs that would level the playing field and allow the effective comparison of the 
costs between those systems currently in production or under development. 
 
C. PURPOSE 
For the purpose of demonstration two aircraft have been selected for comparison 
(the F-16 and its variants, and the Predator UAV in both A and B variants) in a model 
that will result in a cost represented in a unit hour format.  This cost structure will take 
into account the similar and recurring elements of cost associated with the two types of 
aircraft.   
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question of this project is: What is a cost valuation 
method that can be used to compare a manned aircraft platform to an unmanned 
aircraft platform with like missions? 
Secondary research questions include: 1) What are the current methods of cost 
comparison? 2) What are the common elements of cost that should be used to compare 
unlike platforms with similar missions? 3) What other cost considerations should be 
taken into account? 
 
E. SCOPE 
This report includes an overview of current cost comparison methods, an analysis 
of current O&S cost data adjusted for current year dollars, an analysis of current mishap 
data and an estimate of replacement cost adjusted for current year dollars in each 
program, and a comparison of relevant cost data within a model between the sample data 






This graduate research project consisted of the following steps: 1) A thorough 
review of GAO reports, Congressional Research Service Reports, and DoD publications 
that were relevant to the area of study; 2) The compilation of cost, operational, and 
inventory data pertaining to each of the selected aircraft: the F-16 and its variants and the 
Predator UAV; 3) A study of the cost data to determine relevant and common costs 
associated with the 2 types of systems; 4) The creation of a model that uses the cost, 
flight, and inventory data that calculates a cost per unit flight hour; 5) An evaluation of 
the model’s strengths and limitations; 6) An analysis of trends associated with each 
platform’s data; 7) A summary of findings and areas that could possibly require further 
research. 
 
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I, Introduction, provides the rationale for the research and why there is a 
need for a cost valuation method that allows the bottom line comparison of manned to 
unmanned systems, similar to those currently in use to compare manned to manned and 
unmanned to unmanned systems.  This chapter also addresses the primary and secondary 
research questions, the scope of the study, the methodology used within the study, and 
the organization of contents. 
Chapter II, Current Methods of Cost Valuation, examines the current, as well as 
some historical methods of cost valuation used by DoD to compare systems of similar 
missions and type.  The chapter also provides an overview of O&S costs, how they are 
used, and what they contain. 
Chapter III, Data, provides a descriptive overview of what data was used within 
the model and how it was used.  This chapter also describes the significance of the 
operational data that was used, such as flight hour data, and how it relates to the 
inventory data.   
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Chapter IV, Analysis, describes how the model was constructed, what data were 
used and how the data were manipulated in a formula to arrive at the cost per unit flight 
hour metric.  Limitations in the data are also discussed in this section. 
Chapter V, Conclusions, restates the project objectives as well as primary and 
secondary questions.  A summary of the research, findings, limitations, and suggested 
areas for additional research, as it relates to the objectives and research questions, are also 
included in this chapter. 
 
H. PRIMARY CONTRIBUTIONS 
The results of the research will culminate in the creation and demonstration of a 
working model that may be used to compare dissimilar aircraft programs for the purpose 
of cost savings and suitability within the defense budget.  Further, the study will provide 
researchers with a template that will demonstrate the effects of various costs on the final 
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II. CURRENT METHODS OF COST VALUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Cost valuation is the method of comparison used by OSD to track the progress of 
a given program.  These valuations are reported quarterly and are instrumental in 
determining the budget and policy decisions at the OSD level.   It is imperative that the 
numbers reported by Program Manager’s accurately reflect the programs success or 
failure without bias in order to provide the decision makers within the chain the best 
information possible from which they can base their budgeting decisions.  There are four 
types of valuations that are typically used by OSD for budget purposes, they are Unit 
Flyaway Costs (UFC), Program Acquisition Unit Costs (PAUC), Average Unit 
Procurement Cost (APUC), and Unit Flyaway Price (UFP).  The methods differ in 
respect to what is included in the valuation and what is left out. 
 
B. UNIT FLYAWAY COSTS 
Unit Flyaway Costs (UFC, ‘Flyaway Costs’) are usually referred to as flyaway 
costs and are simply those costs that are associated with a specific end item of a system.  
For instance, the flyaway cost of a manned aircraft would be the cost of the actual 
airframe and all government furnished equipment (GFE) such as engine, cameras, 
armament, and avionics.  The flyaway cost would not include such items as ground 
support equipment (GSE), specialized test equipment, or training costs.  In simple terms, 
flyaway costs include all costs that can be applied to the aircraft as it is equipped (less 
pilot) for a given mission.  Other costs that are included in flyaway costs are nonrecurring 
initial production costs and an allowance for changes.  These costs are fixed and can 
therefore be divided into the total expected production run to arrive at the cost per unit of 
production (DoD, 2003; DoD, 1992; Gates, 2004). 
Flyway costs are typically used for manned aircraft, but can be applied to 
unmanned aircraft with some difficulty.  For instance, to pilot an unmanned aerial vehicle 
(UAV), one needs an assortment of GSE, such as the ground control station (GCS).  The 
problem is that the GCS is part of a system that operates several air vehicles and does not 
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need to be reconfigured to do so.  To further complicate this, flyaway costs by definition 
exclude any equipment that is not physically part of the aircraft, hence they exclude GSE.  
The exclusion of this expensive and vital piece of equipment makes the flyaway cost of a 
UAV misleading when compared to the flyaway cost of its manned counterpart. 
 
C. AVERAGE PROCUREMENT UNIT COST 
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) is another cost metric that goes beyond 
flyaway costs; it includes all of the elements of flyaway costs and also the costs of 
procuring Technical Data (TD), training, support equipment, and initial spares.  The 
resulting number is called total procurement cost, which, when divided by the number of 
units to be procured, results in the APUC (DoD, 2003).  APUC is normally used to 
describe what costs are attributed to an entire system on a per unit basis.   
 
D. PROGRAM ACQUISITION UNIT COST 
Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) is composed of two elements; the 
program acquisition cost and the program acquisition quantity.  The program acquisition 
cost is the estimated cost of procurement, plus all research, development, testing and 
evaluation (RDT&E), and military construction (MILCON) that is necessary and related 
to the system’s acquisition.  The other component of PAUC, program acquisition 
quantity, is the total number of fully configured end items intended for purchase over the 
life of the program, and includes research and development units (DoD, 2003).  Where 
PAUC differs from APUC is that it takes into consideration the cost of the entire 
program, rather than just the unit procurement cost, by accounting for RDT&E as well as 
MILCON for a given program. 
 
E. UNIT FLYAWAY PRICE 
The UFP is no longer a DoD recognized method, but was used by the Air Force 
for contractual purposes on the Global Hawk program for the initial air vehicles 1 
through 10; it is included here to demonstrate how cost valuation methods can produce 
inaccurate results when certain costs are excluded.  The problem with the UFP is that it 
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excluded many of the UFC elements.  Essentially, the UFP was the flyaway cost minus 
system and project management, software allowance for changes, system test and 
nonrecurring tooling, manufacturing, and engineering.  These costs, had they been 
included, would have superficially escalated the cost of Global Hawk because it has not 
reached production numbers that would exploit economies of scale.  The UFP was 
abandoned in 2000 in favor of the UFC for various reasons, but mainly because it was 
more accurate in tracking and reporting cost over larger scale production (Drezner and 
Leonard, 2002).   
 
F. O&S COSTS  
O&S costs, as described by the Congressional Budget Office (2001), include 
those costs associated with the operation and maintenance of the individual system as 
well as military personnel.  Some of the categories of costs include, fuel, civilian 
personnel, military construction, contract support costs, training munitions, health care, 
equipment lease and rental, and Temporary Duty costs, such as housing, transportation, 
and subsistence.   O&S costs represent a very significant portion of costs in either system 
and are treated separately in the budget process. 
 
G. CURRENT COST VALUATION SHORTCOMINGS 
According to Geer and Bolkcom (2005), the UAV programs that are currently 
fielded as well as those that are under development are numerous.  The problem with so 
many programs is that it requires oversight to ensure that they are well coordinated and 
that capabilities are not duplicated.  Additionally, UAVs that were once considered to 
perform missions separate from manned aircraft are now competing for manned aircraft 
missions.  As they evolve, UAVs are now possibly duplicating the capabilities of manned 
aircraft.  To determine an investment split and avoid duplication, Congress has positioned 
itself to provide oversight that will ensure the taxpayer’s financial resources are not 
wasted.  Cost valuation is one of the ways that UAV costs can be quantified and gain the 
proper investment split. 
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The first problem with using cost valuation is deciding which valuation method 
has the best fit for the purpose of comparing manned aircraft to unmanned aircraft.  Due 
to the relatively new UAV designs, the program acquisition unit costs in the early years 
of development are relatively high.  As the technology advances and matures, the costs 
will begin to fall, but unit cost comparisons between an established aircraft platform and 
a new design always favor the developed aircraft because the development costs have 
already been absorbed through production units (Drezner and Leonard, 2002).  The use of 
flyaway costs limits this error to an extent but falls short of ideal in other ways. 
Flyaway costs are useful in determining the replacement cost of an aircraft as 
equipped for flight if it does not return from a mission; using flyaway costs for 
comparing aircraft platforms, however, is not necessarily an accurate measure.  
Specifically, flyway costs can be used when comparing manned aircraft against manned 
aircraft, but its use for comparing manned aircraft to unmanned aircraft is flawed.  
Flyaway costs exclude key equipment that is necessary to UAV flight operations and this 
exclusion significantly devalues the flyaway costs.   
For example, using flyaway costs to compare Predator to the F-16 would at first 
seem to be fair, given that only the systems required for flight are compared and the pilot 
is excluded in both cases.  From a practical standpoint however, neither system can fly 
without a pilot.  So if the pilot were included, the F-16 would be able to establish and 
sustain flight while the Predator UAV would remain on the ground.  The Predator, like all 
other UAV’s, requires a sophisticated communication system in order to fly.  While the 
manned aircraft has a pilot inside the aircraft manipulating the controls, an unmanned 
aircraft has a man inside a control station manipulating controls that are then 
communicated to the aircraft.  For this reason, the control station should be included; 
without it, the aircraft would never be able to establish and sustain flight.  Conversely, if 
both aircraft were lost in flight, the F-16 would lose everything in the flyaway costs, and 
possibly even the pilot, while the UAV would lose everything on the aircraft as well, but 
the pilot and the control station could still be used on another UAV.  Therefore, Flyaway 
costs do have an application in this comparison but only in the form of projected losses in 
the case of a Mishap. 
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III. DATA  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents and discusses the data that was collected and used in the 
model that will be described in the analysis chapter.  The data that will be discussed in 
this section are those that are most relevant to aircraft operation and cost analysis.  Those 
elements of data include: 1) flight hours, which represents the amount the aircraft is used 
annually, 2) O&S costs, which are the operating costs associated with the aircraft 
(operation and maintenance plus military personnel), 3) procurement cost, which is the 
initial cost of purchasing the aircraft, 4) aircraft inventory, or the number of aircraft that 
are available for flight annually, and 5) flight hours, which represents actual aircraft 
usage. 
Each subject area will be discussed as it pertains to the F-16 and the Predator 
UAV.  The O&S cost, aircraft inventory, and flight hour data for each aircraft were 
collected from the AFTOC database; for the years FY 1996-2005 for the F-16 and its 
variants, and FY 1999-2005 for the Predator and its variants.  Procurement data was 
collected from P1 sheets accessed at the OSD/OMB website.  In order to get the most 
complete data, raw data was collected in the areas of: flight hours by aircraft and tail 
number, O&S costs by aircraft and category, and procurement costs by aircraft.    
While inventory data were available for each aircraft platform, inventory data that 
was extracted from the flight hour data was used rather than the reported inventory data.  
This ensures that unused aircraft do not dilute the calculated cost per unit fight hour with 
aircraft that do not contribute to the flight hours logged annually for the given platform.  
To accomplish this, first the flight hour data was obtained from the AFTOC database and 
then sorted by aircraft tail number.  The data by tail number was then compiled to extract 
the annual flight time per aircraft.  When this was completed, it isolated the annual flight 
hours per aircraft and the inventory of the aircraft that logged them.  The resulting 
inventory data was then separated from the flight hour data and organized in a separate 
table to display trends in aircraft attrition.   
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B. O&S COST 
Raw O&S cost data were collected from the AFTOC database and were organized 
by fiscal year, type of aircraft and category of cost.  The raw data was separated by 
aircraft to eliminate those types of aircraft that were not relevant to the research.  Then 
the individual elements of cost were analyzed separately by aircraft and fiscal year to 
determine patterns in O&S cost behavior.  While O&S costs included O&M costs plus 
military personnel, a categorical cost breakout of O&S costs is provided in figure 1. 
 
Civ PCS Education & Training Purchased Equip S/W Maintenance 
Civ Personnel Equip/Fac Lease & Rental Supplies Health Care 
Communications Maint, Repair, Minor Constr TDY AVFUEL 
Contr Logistics Supt Mil Personnel Transportation Purchased Equip Maint 
Contract Services Misc Expense Vehicle Rental  
DLR-Flying Printing Training Munitions  
DLR-Nonflying Purch Equip & S/W Maint 
Purchased 
Utilities  
Figure 1.    O&S Cost Categories 
 
 
During the collection and compilation of data, there were some similarities and 
differences noted between the data collected for F-16 and the data collected for Predator 
UAV.  However, there was no significant trend to note in O&S costs as they relate to 
individual aircraft, flight hours, or inventory numbers.   
 
1. Similarities 
For both aircraft, O&S costs represented a significant category of cost and for that 
reason were included in this study.  In fact, O&S costs represent a significant portion of 
the DoD budget as a whole, as can be seen in Figure 2 (CBO, 2001).  In contrast to the F-
16 where O&S costs represent the majority of costs, O&S costs in the case of Predator 
are not nearly as dominant.  In spite of this dissimilarity, the research data still suggests 
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that O&S costs do not vary in direct proportion to number of aircraft or number of hours 
flown, but rather as a function of time.  O&S costs for Predator, while significant enough 
to be included in the study, are not significant enough to dominate the procurement costs 
at this point in the aircraft’s service life.   
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Net Obs Total Obs CY
 
Figure 3.   F-16 O&S Cost Trend 
 
In Figures 3 above and 4 below, the similarities in O&S cost data between F-16 
and Predator are depicted.  Observe that the O&S costs show a gradual rise in costs over 
the period covered in each case.  While this trend might be attributed to a continuous rise 
in GDP, an adjustment made to express costs in constant year dollars continues to show 
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Figure 4.   Predator UAV O&S Cost Trend   
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2. Differences 
While cost data for this category was obtained from the same source for each 
aircraft, there were some categories of cost that did not pertain to the Predator UAV.  
These categorical differences were; training munitions, purchased utilities, S/W 
maintenance, health care, aviation fuel, and purchased equipment maintenance. 
Another difference to note is the trend discovered in Contractor Logistic Support 
and Military Personnel.  While Military personnel costs dominate the F-16 data, they 
merely represent the most significant category for Predator UAV in the first three years 
of data, after which Contractor Logistics Support supersedes as the most significant cost.  
Furthermore, in FY 2004 we see an increase in Contractor Logistic Support that doubles 
from the previous year and then continues to dominate for the remaining years of data.  
Concurrent with the increase in the Contractor Logistic Support is a significant increase 
in flight hours, which consequently doubled in 2004.  This correlation of data is one 
possible explanation for the significant jump in Contractor Logistic Support and likely a 
direct result of combat operations worldwide. 
 
C. PROCUREMENT COST 
1. Similarities and Differences in the Procurement Cost Category 
Procurement data was obtained through P1 sheets accessed on the OSD/OMB 
website.  The P1 sheets list the procurement cost by fiscal years and include a description 
of how the funds were used.  In the case of aircraft procurement, the P1 sheet lists the 
number of aircraft procured in a given fiscal year, as well as how many are expected in 
future years.  In the case of block upgrades, the P1 sheet lists what the block upgrade is, 
how much was spent on it and how many kits will be delivered in a given fiscal year.  
Since procurement data for each aircraft platform was taken from different stages 
in the aircraft’s development, the data is dissimilar throughout the sample years.  In spite 
of the dissimilarity of cost data in this category, the data can still be used to demonstrate 
how to compare the two platforms.  Unfortunately, limitations in the F-16 data do not 
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allow for a complete life cycle cost as the initial development and acquisition costs from 
the start of the program are not included as part of the procurement cost. 
 
2. F-16 Observations 
Figure 5 depicts the procurement cost data collected on the F-16.  The data 
compiled for this project was based on observations from 1996–2006.  Therefore, the 
data does not reflect initial procurement or development costs.  The procurement cost 
represented by this data does, however, include the additional block developments and 
upgrades to the system over the years covered as well as several new aircraft.  Block 
upgrades included in the research were blocks 30, 32, 40, 42, 50 and 52, as well as 
upgrades to the aircraft that will allow it to reach its 8,000 hour service limit, including 
the Falcon Star, which is an airframe modification, and the Falcon 229 engine upgrade.  
Other improvements were made to the aircraft in areas that included, but were not limited 
to, avionics, communications and weapons system integration. 
 












































3. Predator UAV Observations  
Figure 6 depicts procurement cost data collected on the Predator UAV.  The data 
compiled for this project was based on observations from 1999–2006 and includes initial 
aircraft procurement, as well as additional aircraft deliveries and block improvements.  
Unlike F-16, the Predator is unique in that it is designed to be modular, meaning that any 
ground control station or support equipment can be used to operate any air vehicle.  The 
procurement cost therefore includes not only the cost of the air vehicle and also the 
Ground Control Station (GCS), Launch and Recovery Elements (LRE), Ground 
Communications Systems (Predator Primary Satellite Link (PPSL)) and Ground Data 
Terminals (GDT).  Additionally, initial spares, Readiness Spares Package (RSP), support 
equipment and initial technical data and training are included as part of the procurement 
costs.  As with F-16, all models of Predator UAV were included in the data.  These 
include the MQ-1 Predator (medium altitude) and the turbo-prop hunter-killer version, 
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D. AIRCRAFT INVENTORY 
1. Introduction 
Data for aircraft inventories was collected concurrently with flight hour data; if an 
aircraft had not flown in a given year, its tail number was not included in the inventory 
count.  Various reasons can account for why any given aircraft did not fly in any given 
year, however, each of the aircraft types displayed trends consistent with the age of the 
program.    
   
2. F-16 Inventory Data 
F-16 inventory data was collected for the years 1996 through 2006.  The data 
collected represents only those aircraft that flew during each of the years for which data 
was collected.  The inventory data reflects a steady downward trend during the 10 years 
sample period.  This is the sort of trend that is consistent with an aging aircraft fleet.  
Various reasons exist for aircraft attrition, including mishaps, cannibalism, service limit 
and extensive repair or modification.  In some cases, aircraft will return to service, but in 
most cases the aircraft drops from the inventory permanently.  Figure 7 shows the F-16 
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Figure 7.   F-16 Aircraft inventory Data 
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3. Predator UAV Inventory Data 
Predator UAV inventory data was collected for the years 1999 through 2006.  
Like the F-16 data, the Predator UAV data only represents those aircraft that flew during 
each of the years for which data was collected.  Unlike the F-16, Predator UAV inventory 
data displays a linear trend with significant steps during the sample period of 8 years.  In 
this case, the data trendline reflects that which is expected of a new design aircraft that 
has yet to reach its inventory total strength.  While the trend is consistent with ongoing 
acquisition, there may still be a degree of attrition in the aircraft inventory due to 
mishaps, cannibalism and extensive repair or modification.  Similar to F-16, those aircraft 
not included may still return to service at a later date.  Figure 8 shows the Predator UAV 
aircraft inventory trendline form 1999 through 2006. 
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Figure 8.   Predator UAV Aircraft Inventory Data 
 
E. FLIGHT HOURS 
1. Introduction 
Flight hour data collected for the F-16 and Predator were broken down by hours 
per year as well as hours per aircraft.  While the F-16 clearly flew more hours than the 
Predator, the Predator flew significantly more hours per aircraft.  There are several 
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possible explanations.  The F-16 has a larger inventory and therefore fewer hours per 
aircraft are required to meet mission requirements.  Secondly, since Predator can fly 
multiple aircraft off one GCS, it is possible to fly more than one aircraft at a time and fly 
them using only one pilot – a feat that is impossible in manned aircraft.  This capability 
allows Predator to reduce manpower requirements and utilize aircraft more extensively.  
 
2. F-16 Flight Hour Data 
F-16 flight hour data was collected for the years 1996 through 2006.  The data has 
been organized by year to show the hours accumulated, as well as an average flight time 
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Figure 9.   F-16 Flight Hour Data 
 
3. Predator UAV Flight Hour Data 
Predator flight hour data was collected for the years 1999 through 2006.  The data 
has been organized by year to show the amount of hours accumulated, as well as an 
average flight time per aircraft.  Figure 10 displays Predator flight hour data. 
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This chapter organizes the data presented in Chapter III and then analyzes the data 
using a simple model that calculates a cost per unit hour for each platform.  First, the 
chapter will describe the model and then it will explain the variables.  This is followed by 
an explanation of the limitations of the model itself and discuss how and how much the 




The model used for the purpose of comparing costs was a simple model 
constructed in Microsoft Excel.  The model uses various cost inputs, procurement cost 
and O&S cost, and then combines the flight hour data and inventory data to calculate a 
cost per unit hour.  The objective of this cost is to standardize dissimilar platforms with 
like missions to compare them and decide where funds are most needed.  From the 
outputs of the model, we can determine the trends in a given system and quantify them in 
terms of cost per unit hour, which can then be used to compare dissimilar systems and 
measure relative efficiency.  The intent of the cost per unit hour is not to replace any 
current cost structure, nor is it intended to be an all inclusive answer to cost comparison, 
but is rather a way to determine the direction and rate that the most significant costs in a 
given platform are going.  A simplified formula is shown in Figure 11. 
 
 
Figure 11.   Cost per unit flight hour formula 
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2. Results 
In addition to the O&S cost trend that is consistent with research conducted 
previously by Greenfield and Persselin (2002) and CBO (2001), several other new trends 
were discovered when the data was placed into the model.  The trends as they relate to 
the operating cost per unit flight hour are: 1) O&S costs increase as a function of time 
and not in proportion to any other variable; 2) As the number of aircraft increase, the cost 
per unit hour decreases; 3) As flight hours increase, the cost per unit hour decreases; 4) 
Procurement cost has very little effect on cost per hour in a mature system, while O&S 
costs represent a significant portion of the final cost per unit hour; 5) O&S costs and 
procurement costs have equal influence on systems that have not reached full production.   
Previous research by Greenfield and Persselin (2002) and CBO (2001) suggests 
that there is also a correlation between O&S costs and the age of the aircraft.  Studies 
show that the increase in O&S costs typically results from an increase in maintenance 
costs (CBO, 2001).  Furthermore, O&S costs typically follow a life cycle cost curve that, 
after Milestone “C”, represents the most significant costs in any given aircraft design 
(McKinney, 2005).  The trends found in O&S costs for both Predator and F-16 also 
follow this lifecycle cost curve.  For comparison however, F-16 is nearing the top of the 
O&S cost curve whereas Predator is in the early stages of procurement and the associated 
O&S costs are comparatively low.  
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Figure 12.   O&S lifecycle cost curve (Source: McKinney, 2001) 
 
While the O&S costs typically follows a bell shaped curve, as depicted in Figure 
12 above, the cost per unit flight hour follows a “U” shaped curve, where the greatest cost 
per unit hour is realized in both the beginning stages of acquisition (due to high initial 
acquisition costs) and at the end (with the lowest number of operational aircraft in the 
aircraft’s life cycle).  This “U” shaped curve is depicted in Figure 13.   As a mature 
aircraft, F-16’s cost per unit flight hour is represented near the bottom of the curve while 
Predator, still under procurement, is currently near the top of the cost per unit flight hour 
life cycle cost curve. 
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Figure 13.   Cost per unit flight hour lifecycle cost curve (Source: Author) 
 
 
3. Trend Analysis 
This section will interpret each of the previously noted trends and show how the 
interpretations can be applied in budget decisions.  These trends are based on correlations 
observed in the available data.  When more data becomes available, these trends should 
be statistically tested using the appropriate regression analysis.  Given the early stage of 
the predator UAV program, that analysis is not feasible at the current time. 
Trend 1: O&S costs increase as a function of time and not in proportion to any 
other variable.  Observing the rise and fall of O&S costs on the two aircraft platforms 
researched reveals no direct relationship between the annual changes in aircraft inventory 
or flight hour variables but does show a steady increase over time.  Another possible 
explanation for the sharp increase seen in Predator is that it correlates with combat 
operations and extensive use in Iraq.  This steady increase gives an indication of what 
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O&S costs will be in coming years, based on historical data, but does not appear to be 
influenced by any of the other parameters observed for the cost per unit flight hour 
model.  This cost relationship, or lack thereof, is depicted in Figures 14 through 17.  Note 
that while O&S costs increase over time, they do not appear correlated with flight hours 
or inventory.  The observations for F-16 in this area are more conclusive than those seen 
in Predator due to the mature status of F-16 as opposed to the aggressive inventory 
buildup as seen in Predator,.  The Predator buildup does appear to have some correlation 
with an increase in O&S costs when the Predator’s inventory spikes between 2003 and 
2004.   
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Figure 14.   F16 O&S costs compared to flight hours (in nominal dollars)  
 
In Figure 14 above, O&S costs and flight hours do not show any obvious 
relationship.  While initially there seems to be an inverse relationship, both flight hours 
and O&S costs take a sharp drop in 2005, indicating a direct relationship.  In Figure 15 
below, the data again shows an inverse relationship for most periods but a direct 
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relationship in the last period.  Since the data contradicts itself in both cases, a conclusion 
can not be reached based on trends in the data presented.  When there is sufficient data, a 
more detailed statistical analysis might help explain these seeming contradictions. 
 



















Inventory O&S Costs  
Figure 15.   F16 O&S costs compared to aircraft inventory (in nominal dollars)   
  
Figures 16 and 17 depict Predator data in similar graphs to those used for F-16.  
In the case of Predator, the aircraft inventory, flight hours and O&S costs are rising.  This 
seems to correlate closely until 2004, when O&S costs drop sharply while both flight 
hours and inventory continue to increase.  Since the data again contradicts itself, as seen 
with F-16, the data is inconclusive if there is a direct relationship between O&S costs and 
either flight hours or the number of aircraft.  However, as seen in Figures 3 and 4 from 
Chapter III, O&S costs do tend to increase as a function of time, independent of changes 
in other cost inputs. 
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Figure 17.   Predator O&S costs compared to aircraft inventory (in nominal dollars) 
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Trend 2: As the number of aircraft increases, the cost per unit flight hour 
decreases.  This relationship tells us that adding aircraft decreases our cost per unit hour 
because O&S costs can be spread over more aircraft.  The relationship holds because 
total O&S costs remain relatively stable, growing slightly over time, and do not vary 
directly in proportion to the number of aircraft.  In addition, when observing F-16 data 
the procurement costs over this period, largely representing block improvements, are 
lower than O&S costs.  While procuring a complete aircraft might significantly raise 
procurement costs, and hence cost per unit flight hour, block improvements would not.  
This indicates that the use of block improvements to upgrade existing aircraft in an aging 
fleet may be a more cost effective solution to aircraft attrition than the procurement of 
new aircraft. This relationship is more recognizable in the F-16 data due to the maturity 
of the aircraft and stability of the inventory.   
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Figure 18.   Predator Inventory versus Cost per Unit Flight Hour (in nominal dollars) 
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Figure 19.   F-16 Inventory versus Cost per Unit Flight Hour (in nominal dollars) 
 
Trend 3: As flight hours increase, the cost per unit flight hour decreases.  While 
O&S costs do not show any direct relationship to flight hours, flight hours do have a 
direct effect on cost per unit flight hour; the cost per unit flight hour can be reduced by 
using the aircraft more.  A problem with this approach concerns the limited service life of 
the aircraft.  To maximize the use of aircraft without over usage prior to replacement, the 
annual flight hours per aircraft should be budgeted on a per aircraft, per year schedule.  
This would optimize use of the aircraft over the projected service life.  Additionally, from 
manipulating trend 1 to include more aircraft, a greater number of flight hours can be 
accumulated annually, which will further reduce the cost per unit flight hour.  One 
problem associated with the data, however, is that the cost per unit flight hour as 
calculated here for the F-16 is sensitive to the timing within the platform and does not 
reflect the true lifecycle costs associated with that program.  Figure 20 illustrates how the 
Predator’s cost per unit flight hour decreases as flight hours increase, while figure 21 
demonstrates the opposite trend, the F-16’s cost per unit flight hour increases as flight 
hours decrease.  
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Figure 20.   Predator Utilization to Cost Comparison (in nominal dollars) 
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Figure 21.   F-16 Utilization to Cost Comparison (in nominal dollars) 
 
Trend 4: Procurement cost has very little effect on cost per unit flight hour in a 
mature system while O&S costs represent a significant portion of the final cost per unit 
flight hour.  Using block upgrades to increase the service life or capability of an existing, 
 35
mature, aircraft design has very little effect on the cost per unit flight hour.  While any 
procurement costs, including block improvements, add to the cost per unit flight hour, 
this added cost is superficial when the additional flight hours made possible by the block 
improvement are considered.  If the block improvement allows additional flight hours for 
a particular aircraft, then the aircraft can be utilized more resulting in reduced cost per 
unit flight hour over time.  Short term fiscal effects will slightly increase cost per unit 
flight hour, but the costs for block improvements are small compared to the stabilized 
O&S costs.  Additionally, a more comprehensive lifecycle cost per unit flight hour would 
correct for this effect by including both procurement and block improvement costs in the 
cost metric.  Figure 22 illustrates the relationship between time, procurement costs, and 
O&S costs. 
 
























Figure 22.   F-16 Procurement to O&S Cost Comparison (in nominal dollars) 
 
Trend 5: O&S costs and procurement costs have equal influence on systems that 
have not reached full production.  Since procurement costs are highest at the beginning 
of any aircraft program and O&S costs increase steadily over time, their effects on cost 
per unit flight hour are balanced.  Once the design has reached Milestone “C” however, 
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O&S costs become the predominant program cost (McKinney, 2005).  Therefore, 
changes in procurement at the beginning of a program will have significant effects on the 
initial cost per unit flight hour; as aircraft are delivered and enter operation, flight hours 
will increase and drive the cost per unit flight hour down, as shown in the model.  Since 
O&S cost increase over time, their effect remains constant.  Figure 23 illustrates the 
observed relationship between time, procurement costs, and O&S costs. 
 




















Figure 23.   Predator Procurement to O&S Cost Comparison (in nominal dollars) 
 
4. Limitations 
The data collected and utilized for the model were accurate and current but there 
were some important limitations to note.  However, in spite of these limitations the 
analysis is reliable within the scope of the cost model developed for this research.  The 
limitations concerning inventory data, mishap data, and program age are detailed below. 
 
a. Inventory Data 
While the cost per unit flight hour is functional and displays trends that 
can help decision makers gain a perspective on the factors underlying cost per unit flight 
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hour, there are some limitations to its use.  While adding aircraft in the case of Predator is 
continuing throughout the time period considered, the final delivery of the last F-16 has 
already occurred; procurement costs for the F-16 are limited to the block upgrades made 
to existing aircraft, enabling their subsequent return to service.  The functional value of 
the model is not lost, however, as the rate of attrition can be calculated and applied to the 
model to determine how the cost per unit flight hour would be effected by the current rate 
of attrition.  In the case of Predator, both the rate of attrition and the rate of delivery can 
be applied to the model to aid in determining a delivery schedule. 
 
b. Mishap Data 
Aircraft mishaps that result in the loss of an aircraft have a negative effect 
on inventory levels and contribute to attrition; however, the replacement cost of the 
aircraft would have little effect on the cost per unit flight hour.  Nevertheless, mishap 
data would aid in determining the true rate of attrition and future inventory levels.  What 
is important to note is that any mishap that reduces the inventory of a new program would 
have a more significant effect on cost per unit flight hour than would one toward the end 
of an aircraft’s service life.  Therefore, mishaps are more costly at the beginning of a 
program than they would be at the end in terms of cost per unit flight hour.  While 
mishaps were not studied during the course of this research, the effects of mishaps should 
not be ignored and should be researched further.  
 
c. Program Age 
To demonstrate the utility of the cost per unit flight hour model, historic 
data was only gathered to 1996 for the F-16.  Further analysis of the additional historic 
data would provide more detailed statistical analysis of cost trends and would allow more 
accurate rate calculations in O&S cost creep.  While the model can be used to compare 
the F-16 and the Predator in terms of current cost per unit flight hour, the lack of 
historical data on F-16 and subsequent GDP cost adjustment to CY, makes comparing the  
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two aircraft at like stages impossible.  The addition of this data and CY adjustment would 





This chapter summarizes and discusses the research findings and limitations, 
based on the primary and secondary research questions, and then presents suggestions for 
further research and study.   
 
B. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What are the Current Methods of Cost Comparison? 
The current methods of cost valuation include the Unit Flyaway Cost (UFC), 
Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC), and Program Unit Acquisition Cost (PAUC).  
While Unit Flyaway Price (UFP) has been used in the past, it is no longer a current cost 
metric.  O&S costs are used for comparison, but they are treated separately because they 
are not part of any one cost valuation method.  
 
2. What are the Common Elements of Cost that Should be Used to 
Compare Unlike Platforms with Similar Missions? 
O&S costs are common to every aircraft platform and are the most significant 
single cost in any aircraft platform beyond Milestone “C” (McKinney, 2002).  Therefore 
O&S costs should be used when comparing dissimilar aircraft platforms that perform 
similar missions.  Additionally, PAUC represents the most complete per unit cost of an 
aircraft platform and should be used in the initial stages of a program, and also when 
considering block upgrades and in conjunction with O&S costs. 
 
3. What Other Cost Considerations Should be Taken into Account? 
Other considerations that should be considered when comparing one aircraft 
platform to another are inventory data and utilization data.  These variables complete the 




aircraft platform based on the inventory.  In addition, the inventory data and flight hour 
data provides a simplified metric to compare separate platforms on a per unit flight hour 
basis.  
 
C. PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION 
1. What is a Cost Valuation Method that Can be Used to Compare a 
Manned Aircraft Platform to an Unmanned Aircraft Platform with 
Like Missions? 
This research has shown that the current valuation methods do encompass a broad 
enough scope of costs to allow a fair and true comparison between manned and 
unmanned aircraft platforms.  To accomplish a fair and reasonable comparison, O&S 
costs must be considered; current valuation methods do not use O&S costs as a factor.  
Furthermore, other elements, such as inventory and utilization, must be considered when 
valuing an aircraft.  The cost per unit flight hour valuation, while simple, considers these 
variables, in addition to the PAUC, to estimate a cost that fits a historical curve.  The cost 
per unit hour can then be interpreted and used to predict the trends of expenses and what 
actions need to be taken to ensure the needs of the government are met while budget 
dollars are properly managed. 
 
D. SUGGESTED AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Historical Mishap Data 
Historical mishap data were explored for the purpose of the research, but limited 
data precluded their inclusion in the model.  Historical mishap data is important and can 
be used to produce statistical projections for inventory losses and can then be used to 
further refine the results of the model.  Considerations for including the data would be the 
aircraft utilization as a percentage of its useful service life at the time of loss, replacement 
value of the aircraft and the installed equipment, and loss of military personnel, if 
applicable.  Given the degree of variability in the mishap data, and the availability of the 
data required for such an analysis, developing this input to the model was considered 
beyond the scope of demonstration and therefore excluded from the study.  
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2. Regression Analysis 
Regression analysis can be used as an input to the model in a similar fashion to 
mishap data.  Since aircraft attrition is expected with age independently of mishaps, a rate 
of expected attrition can be calculated and applied to the model to help determine when 
the aircraft will become too costly to operate.  Then using that data, the model could 
work backwards to determine the point where investment in a new or alternate platform 
should increase, and when the investment in the current platform should taper off and at 
what rate in order to achieve the most utilization of the aircraft in terms of service life. 
Regression analysis can also be used to statistically verify the cost relationships 
described in this analysis.  Regression analysis simultaneously examines the impacts of 
several variables on unit cost per flight hour, determining the relative impact of each on 
the overall cost metric.  This would help determine the interactive impacts of the 
variables examined, and would enable the analysis to include over potential explanatory 
variable (e.g., inflation, attrition, deployment in a conflict, etc.).  Additional historical 
data for the F-16 might provide sufficient data for regression analysis in this program.  
Regression analysis for the Predator UAV will require additional years in the program 
lifecycle to obtain sufficient data. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The data presented for Predator and F-16 has shown that O&S costs variance 
between platforms are too significant to be considered separately when comparing the 
operating costs of dissimilar aircraft.  For this reason, the cost per unit hour method of 
valuation and comparison is a more accurate summary of the most significant costs 
associated with the operation of a given aircraft platform.  Furthermore, the utilization 
and inventory data provides an ideal metric for comparison.  Further research in this area 
of cost valuation and comparison would allow more refinement to the model and provide 
even greater accuracy for comparison.  It is therefore recommended that the benefits of 
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